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Introduction
Among the more popular contemporary recommendations for improved watershed use and
protection is conjunctive use of surface and underground water resources (Burges and Marnoon
1975; Gleason 1976; Johnson and Peters 1967; Lampe 1987; Mann 1968; Thorson 1978; Trelease
1982; US ACIR 1990). Conjunctive use involves the coordination of surface water supplies and
storage with groundwater supplies and storage, for purposes of sustainable watershed use and
enhanced watershed protection. Among the several potential benefits that have been promoted by
advocates of greater conjunctive use are: improved security of usable water supplies, lessened
exposure to extreme events such as droughts and floods, reduced reliance on costly and
environmentally disruptive surface water impoundments and distribution systems, and enhanced
protection of aquatic life and habitat.
Conjunctive use in a watershed requires a great deal of joint effort among human beings, the
prospects for which will be affected strongly, though not exclusively, by institutional
arrangements that define organizational forms and jurisdictions and provide incentives and
disincentives to individuals (Anderson, 1989; Bittinger, 1964; Grant, 1987; Noel, Gardner, and
Moore 1980; Orton 1986; US ACIR 1990). Using a three-state comparison, Arizona, California,
and Colorado, we are engaged in a major research project that will advance the theoretical and
empirical understanding of the relationships between institutional arrangements governing the
allocation, use, and protection of water resources and the development, implementation, and
performance of conjunctive use programs. In this paper in particular, we explore the effects of
institutionally created heterogeneities among water users on their ability to voluntarily devise
conjunctive use arrangements.
How heterogeneities among resource users foster or impede the creation of voluntary
agreements for resolving common pool resource dilemmas remains an enduring puzzle.1 Thus far,
scholars who have attended to heterogeneities among users have concluded that, at best, resource
users build mutually binding agreements in spite of substantial individual differences, and at worst,
such differences prevent users from realizing voluntary cooperation.2
This dreary tone is understandable in light of the obstacles heterogeneities are believed to
present. Heterogeneities position users differently in relation to access and use of common pool
resources. Some users may even be so advantaged that they are effectively insulated from the
effects of CPR dilemmas, at least for a time, and therefore refuse to cooperate in their resolution.3
Even when all resource users recognize that they would be individually and collectively better off
by cooperating to resolve shared dilemmas, such cooperation may fail to emerge as users disagree
over the distribution of the costs and benefits of achieving more desirable outcomes.4
1 As Ostrom (1994) states: "How individuals who differ substantially from one another agree to sets of rules with
major distributional consequences is not yet fully understood." (p.531).
2 See Hackett, at al. (1992), and Hackett, et al. (1994) for empirical examples of individuals devising voluntary
agreements, in spite of substantial individual differences.
3 See Libecap (1994) for a discussion of numerous such examples.
4 In addition to heterogeneities among users, private information inhibits bargaining. As Farrell (1987) states: If
people come to bargaining already knowing their [own] private values for a good, then no arrangement exists that
will lead them to trade precisely when they should, given that each can choose to walk away (p. 120).
There is, of course, another view of the role heterogeneities play in the emergence of
collective action. Olson's (1965) concept of the privileged group suggests that heterogeneities can
facilitate cooperation, when members of the privileged group sufficiently value the collective good
that they are willing and able to provide it in spite of the actions (or inactions) of the remaining
group members. In these instances, Olson predicts that heterogeneous groups are more likely to
be successful than homogeneous groups in organizing and acting collectively.
These opposing approaches to heterogeneities, far from being in conflict, instead suggest the
need for an explanation capable of incorporating both. Sometimes differences among resource
users present substantial obstacles to cooperation, and sometimes such differences provide relief
from the otherwise insurmountable costs of collective action. Which circumstances and types of
heterogeneities support cooperation, and which support dissension?
The purpose of this paper is to explicitly account for the effects of institutionally created
heterogeneities on the abilities and opportunities of resource users to voluntary engage in and
devise governing arrangements for coordinating their use of two common pool resources ~
groundwater and surface water. Property rights and the ability to exercise public authority are two
types of institutional arrangements that create heterogeneities among resource users. Some
resource users may hold more complete property rights, or superior rights, to those of others, and
some resource users may be granted the authority to devise local governing structures that gives
them a greater voice in devising access and use rules for natural resources.
Institutionally induced heterogeneities in and of themselves do not inhibit or enhance
collective action, rather it is their effect on specific dimensions of the natural resource situation
that produce such effects. Diversity in property rights holdings or in the ability to exercise public
authority affects the likelihood that resources users will choose to engage in collective action. In
the next section we explore and explain two such dimensions that we believe play a critical role in
the ability of resource users to engage in collective action — the positions and numbers of actors
who must cooperate in order to produce a collective benefit, and the ability of resources users to
capture the benefits of their collective endeavors, and to agree upon a fair allocation of such
benefits. Next we turn to an exploration of the interactions between the institutional
heterogeneities and these two dimensions, deriving a series of testable hypotheses. We conclude
with a discussion of how we will empirically test the hypotheses, and what such testing may tell us
about the role of heterogeneities in voluntary collective action undertakings.
Two Critical Dimensions of the Collective Action Process
What would motivate an individual to act with others to produce a collective benefit? Among
the numerous dimensions of collective action processes that have been studied, two that are of
great importance are jointness of production, which refers to the number of actors and their
positions, who without their cooperation a collective benefit would not be produced, and the
ability of the cooperating actors to capture sufficient benefits, as against the rest of the world, and
as against each other, to make a collective endeavor worthwhile.5
Jointness of production may range from low — few actors need cooperate in order to produce
the collective benefit, to high — many actors need to cooperate in order to produce the collective
benefit. But it is not just the number of actors, it is also the positions that they hold. The
participation of certain actors may be critical because of their position of authority in relation to
common pool resources, the property rights they possess, or because of the monetary resources
or technical expertise at their disposal. The bottom line that connects each actor and that requires
that they participate is that they are all affected by one another's use of a common pool resource,
or they affect others' uses of the resource, and that without their cooperation, a collective benefit
cannot be realized.
Capturing the benefits of collective action provides the motivation to cooperate. While
individuals do not have to capture and control all benefits realized as a result of a collective
endeavor, they must be able to capture sufficient benefits to offset the costs of acting collectively.
Numerous factors affect the ability of groups to capture the benefits they jointly produce, ranging
from the physical features of the resource to the institutional setting in which the group acts. For
instance, resource users are unlikely to act collectively to maintain or enhance the flow of a
resource if they do not control the stock.6 Or, if resource users cannot define and enforce
property rights over the benefits that they would produce, they are unlikely to undertake
collective action.
Resource users may be able to capture sufficient benefits so that they would be better off
cooperating, however, they may encounter difficult distributional problems. They may not be able
to agree upon a fair allocation of benefits and costs among themselves. The severity of
distributional issues is thought to turn on heterogeneities. If resource users are relatively
homogeneous, distributional issues are believed to be much less severe, whereas if resource users
are heterogeneous distributional issues are believed to be crippling for collective action (Ostrom
1990, Libecap 1994).
Capturing the benefits (and allocating the costs) of collective action involves two
considerations. First, can the resource users capture sufficient benefits, as against the rest of the
world, to make it worth their while to engage in collective action. Second, can individual resource
users capture sufficient benefits, as against the other members of the group, to make it worth their
while to engage in collective action.
Differences in jointness and in the ability to capture and consume collective benefits strongly
influence individuals' choices to act or refuse to act collectively. However, both of these factors
5 See Ostrom (1990); Schlager, Blomquist, Tang (1992); Ostrom, Gardner, Walker (1994) for in-depth discussions
of factors that affect the willingness of individuals to engage in collective action to resolve common pool resource
dilemmas.
6 See Schlager, Blomquist, and Tang (1992) for a discussion of the impacts of physical features of the resource on
the likelihood of resource users maintaining and enhancing the flows of irrigation systems, groundwater basins,
and coastal fisheries.
must be considered together. Focusing on just one of these dimensions leads to seriously
incomplete and deficient analysis.
It is commonly believed that a collective benefit is more likely to be produced in a situation
characterized by low jointness, i.e., just one or a very few individuals' cooperation is required,
than is one characterized by high jointness. But the likelihood of cooperation in either situation
depends on the ability and the position of the cooperators to capture the benefits and distribute
the costs of a collective endeavor. Even when jointness is low, cooperation is unlikely to emerge
if individuals' positions leave them, unable to capture sufficient benefits from their endeavor to
offset their disproportionate share of the costs.
On the other hand, if these same individuals can capture sufficient benefits to make it worth
their while to cooperate, then collective action is more likely. While this is a happier situation for
the cooperators, it may entail difficult distributional issues from the perspective of the entire
group of resource users. Under certain circumstances, a comparatively small subset of users can
cooperate to produce substantial benefits for themselves, to the exclusion and perhaps even the
detriment of the others.
At the same time, the likelihood of such circumstances arising depends upon the degree of
jointness of production. In situations in which jointness of production is high—that is, many
resource users must cooperate to provide a collective benefit—the concentration of benefits is
likely to be tempered. Even if a subset of users is positioned to capture most of the benefits
resulting from a collective good, others whose cooperation is necessary, but who are not so well-
positioned, are unlikely to cooperate unless they can be assured of either the forbearance of their
better-positioned counterparts or some benefit-sharing arrangement.
Finally, there is the possibility that jointness of production is high, but the many are in a
position to ignore or exploit the few. The cooperation of a large number of resource users may
be necessary to make collective action viable, but the distribution of benefits and costs may be
such that the members of the larger group coordinate their efforts and capture net benefits while
imposing net losses on a smaller group who do not cooperate (or at least do not do so rationally).
Thus, jointness of production and the ability to capture the benefits of collective action must
be considered together if collective action is to be explained adequately. However, whether
jointness of production among resource users is low or high, and whether users can adequately
capture the benefits of collective action, both as against the rest of the world and among
themselves, depends to a substantial degree on critical institutional arrangements, specifically,
property rights, and the ability to exercise public authority. These institutional arrangements, in
turn, introduce heterogeneities among resource users that may promote or inhibit collective
action.
Property Rights and Public Authority
Property Rights Heterogeneities, Assignments of property rights to the use of a resource can
exhibit and establish two broad categories of heterogeneities. Within those conceptual categories,
additional distinctions often become terribly important in empirical settings.
Property Rights Bundles of Differing Scope. The scope of a property right is the set of actions or
activities it covers or includes. Since users of a common resource may have combinations of rights
defining access, withdrawal, etc., we refer also to the scope of property rights buiidles.
Heterogeneities of scope include differences among users in rights of access, rights of use, or
extent of possession.
Differences among users in rights of access to a resource range from the extreme of limited-
versus-unlimited access to more subtle distinctions among limitations upon users. When users of a
common resource enjoy limited rights of access, the limitations usually consist of spatial/temporal
qualifications upon their access.
Spatial/temporal qualifications are relatively straightforward to conceive, and whether
formal/explicit or informal/understood may be thought of or restated as injunctions against
entering a resource or harvesting units except at prescribed places or times. For potential users of
groundwater resources in Arizona and Colorado, spatial/temporal qualifications upon access
include permit requirements and regulations of the spacing or distance between a proposed new
well and already operating wells. Potential users of surface water in Colorado must make good
faith efforts over time to demonstrate the capacity to take water, the demand for the water, and
that their access to the stream and use of the water will not adversely affect other current users.
Only after these conditions are met will a water court judge formally recognize the potential
user's rights of access, subject to spatial/temporal qualifications.
Rights of access are often closely tied to rights of withdrawal, that is, what users
may/must/may not do in relation to the resource and its valued units themselves. Differences in
rights of withdrawal range from the extreme of limited-versus-unlimited uses to more nuanced
distinctions in conditions and qualifications. Differences in rights of withdrawal introduce
additional institutional heterogeneities. For instance, differences in priority to withdraw units
produce heterogeneities, even between two users whose rights of access are subject to identical
spatial/temporal conditions (or none at all). Where common-property regimes assign users rights
of withdrawal with differing priorities, one user or group of users may by exercising their rights of
withdrawal be able to shut others out of the resource altogether, at least temporarily. This
difference in rights of withdrawal is a critical feature of water rights in the western United States,
where priority of right is based upon seniority of continuous use. Differing priorities constitute an
institutional heterogeneity among users of a common resource. ;
7 The priority aspect of western water rights demonstrates the close connection between rights of access and rights
of withdrawal. Those who possess lower-priority rights of withdrawal are essentially foreclosed from use, and
consequently access, until those who possess higher-priority rights have been able to exercise theirs.
Another example of institutional heterogeneities deriving from differences in rights of
withdrawal involve the rules governing groundwater use in California. Owners of lands overlying
an aquifer can withdraw for use upon their land any quantity of water they are able to put to a
"beneficial use". Since virtually any use of water qualifies under California law as "beneficial" and
since the only exception—intentional or knowing waste of water—is almost never found in an
official proceeding against a user, overlying landowners in California possess a virtually unlimited
right of use.8 By contrast, appropriators who withdraw groundwater for use on other lands (either
not owned by them or not overlying the aquifer) are limited by the doctrine of correlative rights
which allows them to withdraw only an amount of water that is "surplus" to the amount actually
used by overlying owners. Another set of rules distinguishes the use rights of public appropriators
from those of non-public appropriators, barring the latter group from invading the rights of the
former.
Property rights may differ among users with respect to aspects of resource use other than
harvesting. For example, in resources where storage and later recapture of valued units is feasible
(see Schlager, Blomquist, and Tang, 1994), users may enjoy different rights to the use of the
resource's storage capacity. We still are uncovering and cataloguing the instances and extent of
these differences among water resource users in Arizona, California, and Colorado, but for now
suffice to say a) that the property rights of users of groundwater in those states do not
automatically include rights to store water underground for later recapture, but b) some users
have been authorized by law or by contractual arrangements with the state to do so. Therefore, an
institutional heterogeneity exists in the rights of users to engage in this aspect of resource use.
A third source of heterogeneities in the scope of property rights bundles enjoyed by users of a
common resource relates to the extent of possession of property rights. A property-rights system
may assign some users what are called "full-ownership" property rights while assigning other
users something less than full ownership. Full ownership includes the authority to transfer (by
sale, lease, or inheritance) one's right to other parties, in whole or in part, and whether or not the
transferee is already a recognized resource user. The water rights systems of Arizona, California,
and Colorado make some users' rights of access and withdrawal fully transferable, other users'
rights transferable under certain conditions, and still others' rights non-transferable.
Property Rights Bundles of Differing Economic Value. Assignments of property rights may link
users to locations or times in ways that create rights of differing economic value. Of course, the
economic value of a user's property rights will vary for a variety of reasons that have nothing in
particular to do with the assignment of the rights themselves—e.g., changes in weather or in the
valuation of commodities in external markets. But differences in the economic value of property
rights may also be inherent in the rights assignments themselves.
Among users of a resource with mobile flows (e.g., fisheries), for instance, property rights
may be assigned in ways that place some users in more advantageous locations and other users in
less advantageous locations. Among users of a resource with nonmobile but variable flows (e.g.,
grazing areas, forests), property rights may be assigned in ways that place users in more
8 Overlying landowners can waive this unlimited right, or stipulate to a quantification of their right, and have done
so in some basin-wide adjudications of groundwater rights.
productive or less productive locations or provide users with access at more fruitful or less fruitful
times.
In a watershed where conjunctive use is being proposed or attempted, users' rights to capture
stored underground water supplies may be more or less valuable depending upon their location
overlying the aquifer. Users whose wells place them nearer a recharge area, where surface water
is being introduced into an aquifer for purposes of storage, are often in a better position to
capture the benefits of the conjunctive-use program (or to deny those benefits to others). This
circumstance may make those users more likely to contribute to the conjunctive-use effort, but it
may also make users farther away from the recharge point less likely to contribute if they lack
assurance of receiving net benefits from conjunctive use. In California, such differences of
position probably facilitated the development of a conjunctive use program in Orange County but
stalled the development of conjunctive use along the Mojave River in California for several years.
Potential Collective-Action Effects of Property Rights Heterogeneities. All other things being
equal (for instance, assuming property rights are recognized and can be enforced), institutionally
created heterogeneities in property rights can affect the collective-action calculus of resource
users in some predictable ways.
1. Property rights heterogeneities can raise or lower the jointness-of-production
requirements within a resource. Whether a "privileged group" exists in a particular
common-pool resource situation depends not only upon the physical characteristics of
the resource and the economic value of the units it produces, but also upon
institutional arrangements such as the concentration of property rights among resource
users. Similarly, a wide dispersion of rights of access and use may increase the number
of users whose cooperation is necessary to resolve a problem.
2. Property rights heterogeneities can raise or lower the likelihood of receiving net
benefits from cooperation for some or all users. The cost users will experience from
cooperative behavior, and the benefits they will be able to capture therefrom, will
depend to some extent on the bundle of rights they possess, the priority their bundle
enjoys relative to those of others, and the connection between their rights and the
characteristics of the resource itself.
3. Perhaps most importantly, property rights heterogeneities alter the bargaining
positions of resource users, affecting both their perceptions of their own situations and
their anticipations of the actions of others. This effect can be perceived perhaps most
clearly in terms of the "default" positions of users. For instance, users possessing the
highest-priority rights or those whose rights are transferable will be able to drive
harder bargains because they will either be the last ones hurt by resource degradation
or they have the option of "selling out" and exiting the situation. If other users do not
possess equivalent rights, their bargaining position is weakened and the likelihood of
their exploitation is increased. And if users know each other's relative property-rights
positions, bargaining may even be or become impossible.
Based on these reflections, we deduce the following hypotheses regarding the effects of
property rights heterogeneities on the likelihood of successful collective action.
Hypothesis PR-1: All other things being equal, in watersheds where differing priorities of rights
allow a subset of users to be effectively insulated from resource degradation losses, the jointness-
of-production requirements for successful coordination among the remaining users will be greater,
their likelihood of capturing net benefits from cooperation will be lower, and therefore the
likelihood of successful collective action will be lower, than in watersheds where differing
priorities of rights do not allow a subset of users to be effectively insulated.
Hypothesis PR-2: All other things being equal, in watersheds where all users are equally exposed
to resource degradation losses, and where some users possess rights of withdrawal that allow
them control over substantial amounts of resource units, while other users possess more limited
rights of withdrawal, jointness-of-production requirements for successful coordination will be
lower, their likelihood of capturing net benefits from cooperation will be greater, and therefore
the likelihood of successful collective action will be greater, than in watersheds where rights of
withdrawal are more nearly equal across all users.
Hypothesis PR-3: All other things being equal, in watersheds where all users are equally exposed
to resource degradation losses, and where some users' rights of access are of substantially greater
economic value than the other users, jointness-of-production requirements for successful
coordination will be lower, their likelihood of capturing net benefits from cooperation will be
greater, and therefore the likelihood of successful collective action will be greater, than in
watersheds where rights of access are of more nearly equal value.
Hypothesis PR-4: All other things being equal, in watersheds where a subset of users experience
resource losses but are endowed with access and use rights of high enough priority to effectively
guarantee their future use of a resource, their ability to capture net benefits from successful
coordination is comparatively greater and the likelihood of their cooperation is greater than in
watersheds where future access and use rights are less certain.
Hypothesis PR-5: All other things being equal, in watersheds where some users can transfer their
access and use rights but others cannot, the jointness-of-production requirements will be greater,
the likelihood of capturing net benefits from cooperation will be lower, and therefore the
likelihood of successful collective action will be smaller, than in watersheds where the extent of
possession of access and use rights is more similar.
Public Authority Heterogeneities. When discussing institutionally created heterogeneities, it is
essential to bear in mind the multiple levels of action that human beings display with respect to the
design, alteration, and use of institutions (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). Human beings operate within
institutional arrangements—i.e., they adopt strategies and make choices in response to incentives,
they follow or break rules, they receive rewards or penalties, and so on. Human being may,
however, also be able (and in many cases are able) to alter institutional arrangements and create
new ones.
This is an essential prelude to our discussion of heterogeneities in the exercise of public
authority, because these heterogeneities can exist at multiple levels. The operational rules (rules-
in-use) in a common-pool resource situation may confer differing amounts of public authority on
users. For example, some users may be authorized or obliged to monitor or sanction the behavior
of others while being exempt from such scrutiny themselves. Just as importantly, if not more so,
users may differ in their authority to shift to another level of action and alter the positions and
patterns of authority regarding resource access and use—in other words, in their authority to
rewrite the rules.
What is true of individual users can be true as well of user organizations. Multiple
organizations may represent or respond to differing or overlapping groups of users of the same
resource—as when a fishery extends across jurisdictional lines, or more than one water users'
association represents users on a complex irrigation system, or more than one public authority
exists in a watershed. When this is the case, institutional arrangements may confer differing public
authority on these organizations with respect to the use of the resource, and (again shifting levels)
these organizations may have differing capabilities in redefining their own authority and that of
other organizations.
Differing grants of authority, in part, stem from property rights, but this time the rights of
management and exclusion. The right of management grants holders of it the authority to regulate
resource use patterns. The right of exclusion grants the authority to define access rights and how
those rights may be transferred (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992:251). These are collective choice
rights. Holders of these rights possess the authority to define who may access resources, and how
resources may be used.
It is not uncommon in the western U.S. for resource users to be granted some form of
management and exclusion rights. This authority is rarely concentrated in a single organization,
rather the state government in conjunction with multiple user organizations concurrently exercise
management and exclusion rights. From water conservation districts in Colorado to groundwater
replenishment districts in Arizona, resource users possess limited authority to decide how to
manage water.
Heterogeneities in rights of management and exclusion arise along several dimensions,
however, initially we have chosen to focus on the types of activities that the rights of management
and exclusion cover. Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker (1990) argue that in relation to any given
common-pool resource (CPR), multiple common-pool resource dilemmas may occur. CPR
dilemmas may occur as a result of demand side activities or supply side activities. Demand side
dilemmas occur as a result of excessive demand placed on harvesting from the CPR. Examples of
demand side dilemmas include production externalities in which users of a shared resource do not
take into account the costs that they impose on one another, and thereby overharvest the
resource; technological externalities in which users interfere with each others' harvesting
activities; and assignment problems in which users race to, and fight over, the most productive
spots in a resource.
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Supply side dilemmas occur as a result of underinvesting in activities that would ensure that
the CPR continues to produce a flow of resources over time. Underinvestment may occur in
relation to maintenance, or in relation to a number of other activities that would either prevent the
degradation of the CPR, or that would enhance its productivity (Schlager, Blomquist, and Tang
1994).
The Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker (1990) typology of commons dilemmas can be used to
evaluate the scope of the authority of an organization. The more dilemmas an organization is
authorized to address, the greater the scope of its authority, and perhaps, the greater its power.
Thus, if an organization was authorized to address a single demand side dilemma, the scope of its
authority would be much narrower than an organization that was authorized to address multiple
demand and supply side dilemmas.
Heterogeneities in rights of management and exclusion can affect the likelihood of successful
collective action to resolve resource dilemmas. At one extreme, in which the user organization
possesses broad rights of management and exclusion, so that it has close to exclusive jurisdiction
over a CPR, collective action is highly likely. The organization can capture the benefits generated
by collective action, and the organization substantially lowers the costs of collective action for its
members. Problems that do arise are likely to center on distributional issues among the resource
users.
Moving away from that extreme the likelihood of collective action declines, as the scope of
the authority of the user organization is reduced, the jurisdiction of the organization does not
match the physical boundaries of the resource, and the membership of the organization excludes
critical resource users. Each of these factors either increases the jointness-of-production
requirements, or reduces the benefits that may be captured as a result of collective action.
At this point, we offer the following hypotheses concerning the effects of heterogeneities
among resource users on their rights of management and exclusion.
Hypothesis PA-1: All other things being equal, in watersheds where a subset of users is able to
use public authority to make enforceable rules governing resource access and use for all, the
jointness-of-production requirements will be lower and the likelihood of successful collective
action will be higher, than in watersheds where subsets of users do not have or cannot access such
authority.
Hypothesis PA-2': All other things being equal, in watersheds where a subset of users is able to
use public authority to make enforceable rules governing resource access and use for all, the
likelihood that the cooperators will be able to capture net benefits from collective action will be
greater, and so will the likelihood of successful collective action occurring, than in watersheds
where subsets of users do not have or cannot access such authority.
Hypothesis PAS: All other things being equal, in watersheds where a subset of users is able to
use public authority to block the creation of rules governing resource access and use, or at least to
insulate themselves from the coverage of those rules, the jointness-of-production requirements for
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successful collective action among the remaining users are greater and therefore the likelihood of
successful collective action is lower, than in watersheds where subsets of users do not have or
cannot access such authority.
Hypothesis PA-4: All other things being equal, in watersheds where a subset of users is able to
use public authority to block the creation of rules governing resource access and use, or at least to
insulate themselves from the coverage of those rules, the ability of cooperators to capture net
benefits will be lower and the likelihood of successful collective action will be lower, than in
watersheds where subsets of users do not have or cannot access such authority.
Conclusions and Implications
The literature on common-pool resources has long contained observations about the impacts
of heterogeneities among users upon the prospects for successful collective action to resolve
resource dilemmas. Much of this previous work has concentrated on heterogeneities created by
physical characteristics of the resource, by cultural or linguistic differences among resource users,
and by differences in the skill levels or technological sophistication of users. This literature has
been highly beneficial in increasing the understanding of common-pool resource situations.
We believe that additional sets of heterogeneities arise from institutional arrangements that
also shape the resource situation. Like the ones studies previously, these institutional
heterogeneities also define and shape the positions of users relative to one another and relative to
the resource.
We certainly are not the first to note the significance of these institutional heterogeneities in
empirical settings. Many case studies of common-pool resource situations have catalogued
differences among users with respect to rights of access and use, and of the authority to alter
those rights or insulate them from alterations attempted by others. The intention of our addition
has been to attempt to provide a more systematic and inclusive review of some important
institutional heterogeneities and of the range of their potential effects on collective action.
We also have observed that previous analyses of the effects of institutional heterogeneities
have diverged widely, from the optimistic predictions about the effectiveness of privileged groups
or the benefits of full-ownership property rights to the dour warnings of the sad fate that awaits
resource users whose economic, legal, and political statuses differ. Accordingly, our effort here
has also been to recast the theoretical propositions concerning the linkages between institutional
heterogeneities and their effects in a way that might encompass the previous predictions about
those linkages.
Our restatement is that the effects of institutionally created heterogeneities depend upon their
impacts upon a) jointness-of-production thresholds for achieving successful coordination, and b)
the positions of resource users with respect to the benefits and costs of cooperation. As
heterogeneities lower jointness-of-production requirements and enhance cooperators' ability to
capture net benefits from cooperation, the prospects for successful cooperation increase. As
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heterogeneities raise jointness-of-production thresholds and inhibit cooperators' assurance of
capturing net benefits, the prospects for successful cooperation dim.
If this restatement stands up to future research, including the research we are conducting in
Arizona, California, and Colorado, then more refined and more accurate predictions and
explanations of the ability of users to achieve successful resolutions of commons dilemmas should
result. In addition to mapping the physical characteristics of a resource, the demographic
composition of the users group, and the economic and technological dimensions of their use of
the resource, researchers can and should also map the institutional "lay of the land" to identify the
relative positions of users with respect to property rights and public authority.
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